

3. *Unravelling the Demonic Text*

The ultimate meaning of desire is death but death is not the novel's ultimate meaning. The demons like raving madmen throw themselves into the sea and perish. But the patient is cured.

– René Girard¹

TWO KINDS OF TEXTUALITY

As Owen Miller has noted, “a powerful link exists between theories of the self and theories of the text.”² The criticism of the “life and works” of notable authors has been displaced by increasingly theoretical interest in the more general phenomenon of ‘textuality.’ Simultaneously the traditional questions pertaining to subjectivity, social or historical context have been opened for reformulation. Michel Foucault’s essay “What Is an Author?” is a famous example. It addresses the question of subjectivity in writing from a postmodern theoretical perspective; the idea of the text as an “expression” of an author’s thoughts has been superseded by the autonomous play of textuality. “Referring only to itself, but without being restricted to the confines of its interiority, writing is identified with its own unfolded exteriority,” Foucault writes in his characteristic intricacy.³ He also comments that the contemporary inclination towards indifference to authorship is a subversion of ancient tradition – instead of immortalising the subject, writing is now announcing the author’s disappearance and death. Nevertheless, the effects of authorship, as Foucault analysed them in his article, are very much operating in commercial, legal and intellectual reality. An author’s name is a customary point of departure: it presents ways to define, group together, differentiate or contrast texts to each other. Authorship is also a historical institution working within a particular discourse. The principles of identifying the “author-function” in a discourse have remained quite similar from the time of Saint Jerome (c. 347-420 C.E.), whom Foucault reads as proposing four principles to identify a single author with his proper corpus. Firstly, author equals a constant level of value (an inferior work ought to be excluded from the corpus); secondly, the author is also a field of conceptual coherence (contradictory texts should be taken out); thirdly, this figure also embodies stylistic unity (those works that have expressions not typical of the

¹ Girard 1961/1988, 290.

² Valdés - Miller 1985, xiii (“Preface”).

³ Foucault 1969/1989, 142.

other works, are not works of this author); and fourthly, he is a definite, historical figure (if a passage mentions events that happened after the author's death, it should be regarded as an interpolated text).⁴ Foucault makes the following summary of his analysis:

(1) [T]he author-function is linked to the juridical and institutional system that encompasses, determines, and articulates the universe of discourses; (2) it does not affect all discourses in the same way at all times and in all types of civilization; (3) it is not defined by the spontaneous attribution of a discourse to its producer, but rather by a series of specific and complex operations; (4) it does not refer purely and simply to a real individual, since it can give rise simultaneously to several selves, to several subjects – positions that can be occupied by different classes of individuals.⁵

The “plurality of self” invoked by a text is one of the features of written discourse that theories of textuality confront and radicalise – even to the point of referring to the demonic in textuality. Already in 1972 Foucault perceived some dangers inherent in the “textualisation” of discursive practices. The immediate context was his debate with Jacques Derrida on the status of reason and unreason, specifically in Descartes's *Meditations* (1641). In his thesis, *Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* (1961), Foucault had illustrated the “exclusion” of madness, and its institution as “mental illness,” with a reference to Descartes. As Descartes establishes the equation *I think, therefore I exist* (“Cogito, ergo sum”), he considers different possibilities for error in his reasoning: sensory defects, delusions, dreams, even the artifices of a powerful demon. Foucault paid special attention to how Descartes dismisses the possibility of madness from his meditation: “But these are madmen [*amentes*, in the original Latin], and I would not be less extravagant [*demens*] if I were to follow their example.”⁶ It is impossible, Foucault writes, to be insane and simultaneously a subject of thinking – the madman can only be an object.⁷ Five years later, Foucault developed this theme in *The Order of Things* (*Les Mots et les choses*, 1966):

For can I, in fact, say that I am this language I speak, into which my thought insinuates itself to the point of finding in it the system of all its own possibilities, yet which exists only in the weight of sedimentations my thought will never be capable of actualizing altogether? [...] I can say, equally well, that I am and that I am not all this; the *cogito* does not lead to an affirmation of being, but it does lead to a whole series of questions concerned with being: What must I be, I who think and who am my thought,

⁴ Ibid., 151.

⁵ Ibid., 153.

⁶ Descartes 1637/1985, 96.

⁷ “Ce n'est pas la permanence d'une vérité qui garantit la pensée contre la folie, comme elle lui permettait de se déprendre d'une erreur ou d'émerger d'un songe; c'est une impossibilité d'être fou, essentielle non à l'objet de la pensée, mais au sujet qui pense” (Foucault 1961, 55).

in order to be what I do not think, in order for my thought to be what I am not?⁸

The modern self, or subject, becomes a recent invention under this line of enquiry; “man” becomes fiction rather than a neutral nomination of a fact. Equally, the author is an “ideological product” for Foucault, and he envisions a future where the author-function disappears and the discourses will develop in the “anonymity of a murmur.”⁹ This dissolution of a unified speaking subject and its replacement by the plurality of anonymous voices presents us with some of the central concerns of post-structuralism, but Foucault never developed a separate theory of textuality. His project is based on the heterogeneity and ambiguity of power, on the multiplicity of forces that make it necessary for thought to address the “unthought” as its foundation. The debate with Derrida clashed over the status of language; whereas Foucault is oriented towards the social and political realities that multiply languages, and exclude some areas of subjectivity and some people from the realm of discursive power, Derrida considers language and thought as inseparably intertwined. “By its essence, the sentence is normal,” Derrida argues: “if discourse and philosophical communication (that is, language itself) are to have an intelligible meaning, that is to say, if they are to conform in their essence and vocation as discourse, they must simultaneously in fact and in principle escape madness.”¹⁰ Foucault maintains that it is possible to be insane and still have access to language (his literary examples include Hölderlin, Nerval, Nietzsche and Artaud).¹¹ Instead of some (transcendental) essence of discourse and thought, Foucault is interested in actual discursive heterogeneity and multiplicity, and in the monological attempts to reduce the subject of enunciation into some essence of rationality.¹² Derrida, in Foucault’s view, was continuing Descartes’s work in abstracting subjectivity from historical or corporeal determinants, and was only interested in protecting the scholarly and limitless “sovereignty which allows it [the master’s voice] to restate the text indefinitely.”¹³ The subject of this intellectual

⁸ Foucault 1966/1989, 324-25.

⁹ Foucault 1969/1989, 159-60.

¹⁰ Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness” (1968/1978, 53-4).

¹¹ Foucault 1988, 278.

¹² “Au milieu du monde serein de la maladie mentale, l’homme moderne ne communique plus avec le fou [...]. Le langage de la psychiatrie, qui est monologue de la raison *sur* la folie, n’a pu s’établir que sur un tel silence.” (Foucault 1961, II.)

¹³ Foucault, “Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu” (1972; Foucault 1979, 27; 1961/1979, 602). – The dispute has extended in its numerous commentaries. Bernard Flynn (1989) favours Derrida’s view and maintains that Foucault has mixed something that he thought was a historical process with the general principle at work in language as such (the exclusion of unreason). John Frow (1986, 213) characterises the confrontation as a clash between a more complex and more straightforward views on textuality; he claims that Derrida’s way of reading is no more “natural” or right than Foucault’s, but he admonishes Foucault for confusing the discursive subject with the empirical, speaking subjects. Robert D’Amico (1984) has seen in this encounter a show-down between historicism and hermeneutics. Shoshana Felman (1978/1985, 54) is perhaps most perceptive in her interpretation that

discourse is established in Descartes's *Meditations* through an exercise of thought against an imaginary, deceptive "evil spirit" (*genium malignum*) – the possibility for bodily or "irrational" elements in the foundation of selfhood are rejected. As Descartes summarises his thought in the *Discourse on Method*:

I thereby concluded that I was a substance, of which the whole essence or nature consists in thinking, and which, in order to exist, needs no place and depends on no material thing; so that this 'I', that is to say, the mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body, and even that it is easier to know than the body, and moreover, that even if the body were not, it would not cease to be all that it is.¹⁴

Foucault interpreted the author as a function of literary discourse – an "author-function" – and, similarly, he reads philosophical discourse as a technique that produces a certain kind of subject. He points out that Descartes's title is "Meditations," and this means not just a simple demonstration of an argument. Meditation aims at modifying the enunciating subject; typically a meditation is a spiritual exercise that alters the state of subject from darkness to light, from impurity to purity, from the clutches of passions to detachment, and from uncertainty to wisdom and tranquillity. "In meditation, the subject is ceaselessly altered by his own movement; his discourse provokes effects within which he is caught; it exposes him to risks, makes him pass through trials or temptations, produces states in him, and confers on him a status of qualification which he did not hold at the initial moment."¹⁵ Text, in other words, may have a dimension as a "technique of the self": it can produce effects on the subject, and reading should pay careful attention to such "subject-effects" – ways in which the state of subject is constructed and mediated to the reader.

Demonic possession is perhaps the most traditional way of explaining madness; the confused and deranged state of madness is made comprehensible and accessible by reference to demons. It is interesting to note how Foucault and Derrida relate to the "evil spirit" and madness in Descartes's discourse. Their readings present us with two different views of textuality and the demonic. The debate on "madness" and "demon" marks the place "beyond language" and the relation of theory to this area. In an interview in the 1980s, when questioned about his relation to his Jewish heritage, to philosophy and ethics, Derrida emphasised that "[d]econstruction is always deeply concerned with the 'other' of language."¹⁶ The manner of engaging with this

both positions, those of Foucault *and* Derrida, are paradoxical, and therefore "philosophically untenable," but that they nevertheless illustrate the position of a subject contradicted by its own language, constantly overstepping itself, passing out into the other. "Perhaps the madness of philosophy and the philosophy of madness are, after all, each but the figure of the other?"

¹⁴ Descartes 1637/1985, 54.

¹⁵ Foucault, "Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu" (1972; Foucault 1979, 19; 1961/1979, 593).

¹⁶ Derrida 1984, 123.

otherness, however, has been different from Foucault's. Roy Boyne, in his *Foucault and Derrida: The Other Side of Reason* (1990) emphasises this difference by claiming that the relationship to otherness is to the Foucault of *Folie et déraison* the one of a mystic, and to Derrida that of a tragedian.¹⁷ When Foucault wrote his history of madness, he claimed that he was not writing a history of psychiatry (a machinery of appropriation and subordination rather than treatment for Foucault), but of "madness itself" before being captured by knowledge.¹⁸ He is not writing a history of the language of psychiatry (or, "reason"), but an "archaeology of the silence" as madness is denied the right to speak.¹⁹

Derrida tackles the "madness" of this project, and asks whether an "archaeology" of silence would not still be within an order of reason; if one starts to speak of silence, it is not so silent any more. "[E]verything transpires as if Foucault *knew* what 'madness' means. Everything transpires as if, in a continuous and underlying way, an assured and rigorous precomprehension of the concept of madness, or at least of its nominal definition, were possible and acquired."²⁰ For Derrida, this means that if Foucault has an idea of madness, then it is also a linguistic idea, all through, and embedded in the system of thought he simultaneously aims to oppose. Derrida interprets our being as embedded in and constituted by our system of signs; this holds true, for example, for the case of memory. Derrida writes in "Plato's Pharmacy" that "Memory always therefore already [a favourite expression of Derrida] needs signs in order to recall the non-present, with which it is necessarily in relation. [...] But what Plato *dreams* of is a memory with no sign. That is, with no supplement."²¹ The endless lack and line of substitutes for the object of desire in Lacanian theory is matched by Derrida's insistence on the deferral and differing (*differance*) of any fullness of presence, or meaning, and on "supplementarity" as inseparably intertwined in our being.²² In *Of Grammatology* (*De la Grammatologie*, 1967) he expands his analysis of this process in Rousseau's *Confessions* as a theory of reading a text:

No model of reading seems to me at the moment ready to measure up to this text – which I would like to read as a *text* and not as a document. Measure up to it fully and rigorously, that is, beyond what already makes the text most legible, and more legible than has been so far thought. My only ambition will be to draw out of it a signification which that presumed

¹⁷ Boyne 1990, 54.

¹⁸ Foucault 1961, vii.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, ii.

²⁰ Derrida 1968/1978, 41.

²¹ Derrida 1972/1981, 109.

²² Jonathan Culler has summarised Derrida's discussion of supplementary logic in Rousseau ("nature" as supplemented by "education," or culture): "The logic of supplementarity [...] makes nature the prior term, a plenitude which was there at the start, but reveals an inherent lack or absence within it and makes education something external and extra but also an essential condition of that which it supplements." (Culler, "Jacques Derrida"; in Sturrock 1979/1992, 168).

future reading will not be able to dispense with [*faire économie*]; the economy of a written text, circulating through other texts, leading back to it constantly, conforming to the element of language and to its regulated functioning. For example, what unites the word “supplement” to its concept was not invented by Rousseau and the originality of its functioning is neither fully mastered by Rousseau nor simply imposed by history of the language. To speak of the writing of Rousseau is to try to recognize what escapes these categories of passivity and activity, blindness and responsibility. And one cannot abstract from the written text to rush to the signified it *would mean*, since the signified is here the text itself. It is so little a matter of looking for a *truth signified* by these writings (metaphysical and psychological truth: Jean-Jacque’s life behind his work) that if the texts that interest us *mean* something, it is the engagement and the appurtenance that encompass existence and writing in the same *tissue*, the same *text*. The same is here called supplement, another name for differance.²³

The famous dictum from this study – *il n’y a pas de hors-texte* [there is nothing outside of the text, or, no outside-text]²⁴ – should be understood in the particular sense Derrida gives to “text,” and writing in general. It is a structure always marked by a trace of the other, and he stresses that “[w]riting can never be thought under the category of the subject”²⁵ – the signified should not be searched beyond textuality, as the “text itself” is its own meaning. This is a position relating to metaphysics: Derrida writes in “The Supplement to Copula” that “‘Being’ presents itself in language precisely as that which is beyond what would be only the inside (‘subjective,’ ‘empirical’ in the anachronistic sense of these words) of a language.”²⁶ Foucault’s attempt to voice the silence is for Derrida an impossible claim on the basis of a Heideggerian interpretation of Being.²⁷ “Language’s final protective barrier against madness is the meaning of Being,” Derrida claims;²⁸ everything transpires here as if Derrida knew the meaning of Being. Indeed, he claims that this “transcendental word” is precomprehended in all languages, and that even if this meaning is not tied to a particular word or to a particular system of language, it is nevertheless tied to “the possibility of the word in general.”²⁹

Boyne writes that where Derrida thinks there is no “outside-text,” Foucault would rather claim that there is no outside of history.³⁰ The decon-

²³ Derrida 1967/1976, 149-50.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 158.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 68.

²⁶ Derrida 1972/1989, 90.

²⁷ “If we point out that [...] Heidegger distinguishes the meaning of ‘being’ from the word ‘being’ and from the concept of ‘being,’ this is the same as saying that for Heidegger the condition for a language’s being a language is no longer the presence within it of the word or the concept (*signified*) ‘being,’ but rather the presence of another concept that remains to be defined.” (*Ibid.*, 112.)

²⁸ Derrida 1968/1978, 309n22.

²⁹ Derrida 1967/1976, 20-21.

³⁰ Boyne 1990, 86.

struction of Western metaphysics is a persistent inquiry into our “belonging” to the language of metaphysics, and an attempt to discover the “non-place” which would be the ‘other’ of philosophy.³¹ In this sense the relationship of deconstruction to philosophy is complex and ambivalent. On one hand, Derrida writes derisively about all the “empiricist” or “non-philosophical motifs” that have constantly tormented philosophy, and “have had nothing but the inevitable weakness of being produced in the field of philosophy [...]”.³² On the other, Derrida grants a special role to the “demonic hyperbole” (*daimonias hyperboles*); to the constant attempt of philosophy to break its own boundaries, the limits of reason. “The historicity proper to philosophy is located and constituted in the transition, the dialogue between hyperbole [the project of exceeding every finite and determined totality] and the finite structure [...]”.³³ The basic difference between the readings of Derrida and Foucault on Descartes and madness reverts to language as related to transcendent Being, or language as related to particular, historical and imperfect, corporeal beings. Derrida’s starting point is that Descartes should be read beginning from “the internal and autonomous analysis of the philosophical content of philosophical discourse.”³⁴ Foucault gives no such privileges of autonomy to philosophy, but points out that the concepts that Descartes is using have different (medical, juridical, political) histories, and that the analysis should not disconnect the text from this history and the ideology it furthers.

Dislocation and disruption of established, ideological conceptions and hierarchies is as important for Derrida as it is for Foucault. It is Derrida’s emphasis on the primary status of writing in general that makes language inherently “demonic” for him, instead of making him address some resolvable conflict external to language, one that could be corrected by proper use of it. The theme of supplementarity leads Derrida to look into “the being-chain of a textual chain, the structure of substitution, the articulation of desire and language,” into “the abyss,” the indefinite multiplication of representation.³⁵ Therefore he is very interested in how those who have thought and written about language have identified “good” and “evil” aspects in the writing; “the good and natural is the divine inscription in the heart and the soul; the perverse and artful is technique, exiled in the exteriority of the body.”³⁶ Derrida is principally analysing language in a fallen world: there is only “fallen writing,” even if our communication is directed towards the dream of “divine inscription.” The demonic hyperbole of Descartes – the hypothesis of an evil demon counterfeiting everything we know and take for granted – is for Der-

³¹ Derrida 1984, 111-12.

³² Derrida 1967/1976, 19. Cf. Derrida in the context of Levinas: “[...] *empiricism*, for the latter, at bottom, has ever committed but one fault: the fault of presenting itself as philosophy” (1968/1978, 151).

³³ Derrida 1968/1978, 60.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 44.

³⁵ Derrida 1967/1976, 163.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

rida an essential philosophical activity: an attempt to think beyond the limits of reason; but, because this is still *thinking*, it is trapped within the bounds of language and reason. The attempt to confront otherness takes a demonic form for Derrida; the project of exceeding the “totality” is possible only in the direction of “infinity or nothingness.” Within language and reason we can attempt to think their other – and this is possible only with a “precomprehension of the infinite and undetermined totality” (that can be paralleled with the precomprehension of “madness” that Derrida identified in Foucault’s project). Derrida writes:

This is why, by virtue of this margin of the possible, the principled, and the meaningful, which exceeds all that is real, factual and existent, this project is mad, and acknowledges madness as its liberty and its very possibility. This is why it is not human, in the sense of anthropological factuality, but is rather metaphysical and demonic: it first awakens to itself in its war with the demon, the evil genius of nonmeaning, by pitting itself against the strength of the evil genius, and by resisting him through reduction of the natural man within itself. In this sense, nothing is less reassuring than the Cogito at its proper and inaugural moment.³⁷

The demonic nonmeaning is, according to the wider implications of Derrida’s theory, lurking everywhere, as our “onto-theological” certainty is threatened by the effects of differance. The difference between “the appearing and the appearance,” anticipates all the other differences: something cannot be lived, experienced, and simultaneously understood (represented to consciousness), without the intrusion of a fundamental fracture or spacing, which opens the figurative gates of hell. “Arche-writing as spacing cannot occur as such within the phenomenological experience of a *presence*. It marks *the dead time* within the presence of the living present, within the general form of all presence.”³⁸ So far as the “critique of logocentrism is above all else the search for the ‘other’ and the ‘other of language,’”³⁹ it is also an engagement with the demonic aspects of language, as interpreted under the general heading of “writing” or “textuality.”

TWO STRATEGIES OF READING

Ernest Gellner, a British philosopher, noted in the 1950s how modern philosophy has always found new ways to address the “demon” invoked by Descartes. This demon signifies a radical doubt and mistrust towards everything outside of thinking; ‘history’ and ‘language’ are examples of such profoundly doubtful areas – they create illusory “realities” that have to be exposed, controlled and exorcised by philosophical thought.⁴⁰ In literary stud-

³⁷ Derrida 1968/1978, 56.

³⁸ Derrida 1967/1976, 68.

³⁹ Derrida 1984, 123.

⁴⁰ Gellner 1974, 3-7.

ies, Constantin-George Sandulescu has proposed a theory of avant-garde texts as “devil’s language”: modern literature does not aim at (mimetically) representing reality, or at (neutrally) communicating some idea from sender to receiver. Instead, it revels in “communicative sin,” and builds texts that are anti-mimetic, anti-communicative, and often profoundly idiosyncratic in their use of language. Sandulescu’s archetypal example is Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake* (1939), which Samuel Beckett characterised by saying: “It is not about something. It is that something itself.”⁴¹ Derrida has repeatedly joined his discourse with such texts as those from Blanchot, Ponge, Joyce, Artaud, or Kafka.⁴² It is likely that his theories, like all theories, have only a certain area of competence where they are more pertinent than in others (despite any claims of fundamentality or universality by the advocates). Even if it is probably perfectly possible to apply deconstructive strategies to any text, there are many cases where the “subject-effects” of a text (as identified by Foucault in the case of meditations) are more important concerns for textual analysis. The capacity of a text to construct, present and articulate some conception of subjectivity, or self, is an equally important feature of textuality as are its disruptive possibilities (which constantly undermine and deflect any such process). It is finally the task of the reader to activate these different aspects of the text, to resist others while pursuing and building on others – a “total revelation” of the “truth” of the text is, after all, an illusion. This active character of reading as selection and construction negotiates between the different poles of identity for a text; the identity should not be denied, but the identity produced by reading should also address – not deny or reduce – the tensions and conflicts in the text. Owen Miller has made a distinction between intertextual and thematic identity that is relevant here. He writes:

[...] I would argue that intertextual identity implies some sort of ordering of the texts, whereby the focused text may function as figure to its intertext’s ground. Thematic identity, on the other hand, fixes the ground outside the specific texts in a synecdochic fashion, that is as illustrating a more general concern, reflecting a sort of common denominator (differences of moral implication [in his example]) to which they are subordinated.⁴³

These two positions identified by Miller are adopted by the reader in order to produce an interpretation, or identity, for the text. It is possible to take a more radical stance on intertextuality than Miller here does. Decon-

⁴¹ Sandulescu 1988, 7-9. In the word-plays Sandulescu operates with, “D.E.V.I.L.” stands for “Device for the Explicit Verbalization of Idiosyncratic Language.”

⁴² Derrida comments on his relation to these texts in an interview by Derek Attridge: “Those texts were all texts which in their various ways were no longer simply, or no longer only, literary. [...] Their questioning is also linked to the act of a literary performativity and a critical performativity (or even performativity in crisis).” (Derrida 1992, 42.)

⁴³ Miller 1985, 29.

structive criticism repeatedly questions “identity” in its numerous senses, as an authorial intention as well as in any attempt to restrict the difference of the text by establishing some sufficient “whole,” or endpoint for analysis. But even then we could say that there are certain thematic concerns (connected with the aesthetics of difference and discordance) at play in such an activity. In the previous chapters, the therapeutic readings of tragic conflict tended to lean on the Hegelian side in their emphasis on the dialectic and possible synthesis of the conflicting forces; Nietzsche, with his daimonic reading, acts here as a borderline figure as he stressed the aesthetic tension and simultaneous existence of opposites. A total reversal of a therapeutic reading would categorically deny any integrative attempts, celebrate the unrestricted intertextuality and complete lack of meaning (this is not, it should be pointed out, what Derrida pursues in his deconstructive readings). Beyond the differences in terminology, Paul Ricoeur’s notion of the “dynamic identity” of the text captures well some of the important concerns in recent theoretical developments of textual identity. For Ricoeur, we identify the identity of the text as an answer to “What [is it]?” – basically the answer is a structuring process, one that concerns emplotment, recognition of underlying paradigms, history and tradition. When we are looking for an identity we are engaging with the text with “narrative intelligibility” that, according to Ricoeur, “shows more kinship with practical wisdom or moral judgment than with theoretical reason.”⁴⁴ The production of identity comes close to subsuming a question of difference into itself (because differing can be seen as the negative moment of connection); Ricoeur maintains that the identity of the text is “dynamic” as it mediates between numerous “dialectical tensions” – between united plot and fragmented events, between general intelligibility and the concrete goals, means and contingencies of the text, and between the sediments of tradition and “newness” in the work. A dynamic identity emerges in the act of reading as an intersection: the “world of the text” and the “world of the reader” confront, and the reader is “displaced” by the text.⁴⁵ The separation between the “outside” and “inside” of the text becomes problematic because of the central place of this intersection; or, as Derrida writes, “The Outside ~~X~~ the Inside.”⁴⁶

The characters possessed by the daimonic in the classical tragedies could function as sites of contradiction and disunity. The main alternatives that were offered in different readings of these conflicting selves are here emerging also as a response to the ambiguous characteristics of the text. “The other of language” is deeply entangled in our conceptions of textuality; in reading something as “demons” or “demonic” in a text one is constantly challenged by opposing demands, similar to those met by Derrida and Foucault in their readings of madness. The fundamental plurality and ambivalence that surfaces in this area (as illustrated in the following chapters) is

⁴⁴ Ricoeur 1985, 177.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 183.

⁴⁶ Derrida 1967/1976, 44.

open to “thematic” or “therapeutic” reading that aims at an integration, explanation, understanding; this, on the other hand, participates in the “violence of reason” towards its other. The plural is in danger of being made monological. From another viewpoint, however, the complete denial of integrative reading and interpretation amounts to essentialising the conflicting elements in the demonic. Ricoeur’s “dynamic identity” of a text is one way of articulating this necessary tension and dialectic between particular interpretations of demons or “demonic textuality” and that “reserve of otherness” that will always remain irreducible. As the “thematic” and “deconstructive” moments of analysis inform each other they do not remain immutable; the awareness of multiple centres of signification and the radical effects of the reader’s position or his decontextualising activity shifts the focus from the “truth” of a text to its rhetoric.⁴⁷

Derrida has explored the demonic versus the integrative aspects of language in his essay “Plato’s Pharmacy.” The point of departure is the questionable metaphysical status of writing in many systems of thought. As Paul writes in the Bible: “the written code kills, but the Spirit gives life.”⁴⁸ Derrida tackles the myth about writing’s origin in Plato’s *Phaedrus* and the condemnation it receives there. According to this story (narrated by Socrates in the dialogue), the ancient Egyptian god Theuth first invented writing, along with numbers and calculation and many other things. He brought these inventions before King Thamus (the representative or incarnation of Ammon, the high god of the sun), and the King blamed or praised the usefulness of each one. The discussion of writing was of special interest to Plato, as it is to Derrida:

[...] Theuth said, “This discipline, my King, will make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their memories: my invention is a recipe (*pharmakon*) for both memory and wisdom.” But the king said, “Theuth, my master of arts, [...] your paternal goodwill has led you to pronounce the very opposite of

⁴⁷ The importance of rhetoric in the text rises from its complex status as a layer of activity and understanding that moves beyond mere syntax and grammar. Wayne C. Booth, in his classic study *The Rhetoric of Fiction* pays attention to the various, often indirect ways the author (in the text) implies something to the reader and thereby persuades him, even if the text at the level of grammar and syntax seems to say something else. According to Booth “the greatest literature” is “radically contaminated with rhetoric,” and engages readers with its ambiguous and indirect means. (Booth 1961, 98.) Rhetoric can be given both pragmatic and deconstructive interpretations, the latter here exemplified by Paul de Man. In his article “Semiology and Rhetoric,” de Man admits that the exact theoretical distinction between the epistemology of grammar and the epistemology of rhetoric is beyond his powers; he nevertheless points to the importance of the “rhetorical question” to literary studies. The undecidability between a literal meaning and a figurative meaning marks the domain of rhetoric for de Man: “Rhetoric radically suspends logic and opens up vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration.” (de Man 1979, 10.) This ignores the more pragmatic aspects of rhetoric in the text (the establishment of “good” and “evil,” or sympathy and distance in the use of figurative language or narration, for example).

⁴⁸ 2 Cor. 3:6.

what is their [written letters'] real power. The fact is that this invention will produce forgetfulness in the souls of those who have learned it because they will not need to exercise their memories, being able to rely on what is written, using the stimulus of external marks that are alien to themselves rather than, from within, their own unaided powers to call things to mind. So it's not a remedy for memory, but for reminding, that you have discovered. And as for wisdom, you're equipping your pupils with only a semblance of it, not with truth. Thanks to you and your invention, your pupils will be widely read without benefit of a teacher's instruction; in consequence, they'll entertain the delusion that they have wide knowledge, while they are, in fact, for the most part incapable of real judgment. They will also be difficult to get on with since they will be men filled with the conceit of wisdom, not men of wisdom.⁴⁹

Derrida's analysis of this section disseminates its meaning in numerous directions. The main thrust of his argument is joined to the double meaning of the key term, *pharmakon*: it can signify both 'poison,' as well as 'remedy' or 'cure.' By telling his story, Socrates is opposing the practice of replacing "genuine" speech with texts (a discourse on love, ghost-written by Lycias and recited by Phaedrus is the immediate topic of this discussion). This implies a preference of "authorised" speech over the somehow artificial and supplementary writing: the singular meaning of presence over the dangers of differance. Plato exemplifies perfectly the ambiguous suppression of writing that Derrida has also analysed elsewhere; the logic of "that dangerous supplement" in Rousseau's text, for example, is double – "writing serves only as a supplement to speech," according to Rousseau, but it adds only to replace, it intervenes. Nature is innocent and good, and the negative elements of culture alienate us from our innocence – therefore "the negativity of evil will always have the form of supplementarity."⁵⁰ The demonic dilemma is that we are cultural beings, and therefore can never really achieve a complete transition beyond this "domain of evil." Derrida is quick to point this out, and he also maintains that the preference of speech over writing in Plato carries ideological undertones, as well. It acts to support the authority of the father, and suppresses non-authorised interpretations or heresies.

Socrates: Writing, Phaedrus, has this strange quality, and is very like painting; for the creatures of painting stand like living beings, but if one asks them a question, they preserve a solemn silence. And so it is with written words; you might think they spoke as if they had intelligence, but if you question them, wishing to know about their sayings, they always say only one and the same thing. And every word, when once it is written, is bandied about, alike among those who understand and those who have no interest in it, and it knows not to whom to speak or not to speak; when

⁴⁹ *Phaedrus* 274c-275b; translation here stands as it is used in Derrida 1972/1981, 75, 102 (most of the original Greek inserted by Derrida has been omitted). Elsewhere I have used Harold North Fowler's English translation, and the standard Greek edition of this text, both available on the Internet by the Perseus Project (www.perseus.tufts.edu).

⁵⁰ Derrida 1967/1976, 144-45.

ill-treated or unjustly reviled it always needs its father to help it; for it has no power to protect or help itself.⁵¹

This lack of “protection” of the text is interpreted by Derrida to imply a demand for ideological control. The King in Plato’s myth rejects writing, as the “father is always suspicious and watchful towards writing.” A written text leaves its author, and the “specificity of writing would thus be intimately bound to the absence of the father.”⁵² Writing is “orphan,” and therefore (working in the absence of its author who can not verify his proper intentions) always open for “ill-treatment” or misreadings.

The fundamental irony of Plato’s text, of course, is that it is a written text, itself; Socrates never wrote anything, and it remained for his pupil, Plato, to record the living reality of his teacher’s dialogues into writing. The paradox of a text written to denounce writing can be suspected to have its internal tensions, and Derrida exploits these possibilities in his deconstructive reading. As Phaedrus asks for “another sort of discourse,” that would be better and more effective than writing, Socrates says that he is thinking the “word which is written with intelligence in the mind [*psuchêi*: mind, soul] of the learner, which is able to defend itself and knows to whom it should speak, and before whom to be silent.”⁵³ The metaphor that Plato is using to describe the “living and breathing word of him who knows”⁵⁴ is borrowed from the very thing this dialogue is trying to exclude from the truth. The truth is “written in the mind,” and elsewhere Plato had developed a theory of truth and logic as inborn parts of our nature; in *Meno*, Socrates proves how even an ignorant slave boy can solve geometrical problems because the rules of logic are inherent in our thought. We only have to learn how to “unforget” these ideas (in *anamnesis*).⁵⁵ The Platonic project aims at recovery of the divine logic and ideas by studying our thinking in purely natural and internal means. In this view, “writing is essentially bad” because it is external to memory.⁵⁶ It can not remember the truth, but is only a way of reminding (*hupomnêsai*) those who already have the deeper knowledge; “[n]ot remembering, by anamnesis, the *eidos* contemplated before the fall of the soul into the body, but reminding himself, in a hypomnesic mode, of that of which he already has knowledge.”⁵⁷ Derrida argues, that this true knowledge is already a sort of writing (as the metaphor “written in the soul” betrays); as *logos* (word, reason) enters discourse, it is always already a sort of mimesis, repetition and reproduction of the absent origin. Platonism, like all forms of reason, are in Derrida’s view inescapably involved in the aporia of language and differance: “Differance, the disappearance of any originary presence, is *at*

⁵¹ *Phaedrus* 275d-e.

⁵² Derrida 1972/1981, 77.

⁵³ *Phaedrus* 276a.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Meno* 81e-85d. (Cf. *Phaedo* 72e.)

⁵⁶ Derrida 1972/1981, 103.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 135.

once the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of truth.”⁵⁸

The opposition between speech and writing is thus open for deconstruction; speech is not really the autonomous primary term that writing is trying to reproduce, but, instead, we have here two kinds of writing. The legitimate one (speech) is good writing (natural, living, knowledgeable, intelligible, internal, speaking), and stands linked by its opposition to its other (the written text) that is bad – “moribund, ignorant, external, mute artifice for the senses,” as Derrida lists.⁵⁹ Furthermore, there exists a Greek term etymologically closely related to *pharmakon* – *pharmakos* – that Derrida employs in his reading. *Pharmakos* has been compared to a scapegoat; it was used of “wizards, magicians, poisoners,” but also of sacrificial victims that were ceremoniously driven outside the city, fustigated (aiming at their genital organs), and sometimes killed to purify the city. This old ceremony was carried out when a great calamity, like famine or pestilence, threatened the city. As a ceremony of purification, it took place at the boundary limiting city from the threatening other; it addresses the internal/external division and casts the unlucky *pharmakos* into the role of evil, “both introjected and projected.”⁶⁰ The working of boundaries had a cathartic and calming role, as it addressed those elements of the collective self (the city) that could be the cause of alarm; Derrida suggests that the *logos* of Socrates operated analogously. He is called affectionately *pharmakeus* in Platonic dialogues: a wizard and master of words which have surprising and unsettling consequences, as much as they have curative or reassuring power.⁶¹ Reason is therefore itself a sort of *pharmakon*, an ambiguous kind of cure (exorcism) as it is simultaneously also taking part in the demonic aspects of language it tries to deliver us from. “The demonic speech of this thaumaturge [Socrates] (en)trails the listener in dionysian frenzy and philosophic *mania* [...]”⁶² Socratic/Platonic reason, therefore, denounces writing defensively; writing is cast in the role of *pharmakos* and it is identified with the “evil” aspects of language, but actually philosophic reason can never purify itself from its other completely. “The expulsion of the evil or madness restores *sôphrosunê* [wisdom],”⁶³ but it has to be repeated again and again. Derrida notes that the ritual of *pharmakos* was reproduced every year in Athens, up through the fifth century.⁶⁴

Derrida’s reading is remarkable, but it is also decisively one-sided: he strategically refuses to recognise and read the integrative, or healing dimension of Socratic text.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, I maintain that these two moments are

⁵⁸ Ibid., 168.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 149.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 133.

⁶¹ Ibid., 134.

⁶² Ibid., 118. Derrida’s reference is to the *Symposium*, 218b.

⁶³ Ibid., 133.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 134.

⁶⁵ Derrida can hardly be out-smarted as a textual reader of Plato, and this is not in my interests here. The question is rather of giving several elements in the dialogue an empha-

both important for a reading of the demonic – the irresolvable conflict and the pursuit of an integrative interpretation. The demonic in *Phaedrus* not only amounts to attempts to denounce the aporias and difference of writing. Already in the first part of the dialogue Socrates refers to his “spirit and sign” (*daimonion*) that reproves him for his initial mistake: he did not pay proper respect to the subject of their discourse – love, Eros – as he focused only on the rhetoric. “I was distressed lest I be buying honor among men by sinning against the gods.”⁶⁶ Furthermore, the discussion addresses the fantastic creatures of myths, the Centaurs, the Chimaera, Gorgons and Pegasus, and multitudes of beings with “strange, inconceivable, portentous natures.”⁶⁷ Socrates seems to renounce such myths, but actually his view is more complicated and worth quoting here:

But I have no leisure for them at all; and the reason, my friend, is this: I am not yet able, as the Delphic inscription has it, to know myself; so it seems to me ridiculous, when I do not yet know that, to investigate irrelevant things. And so I dismiss these matters and accepting the customary belief about them, as I was saying just now, I investigate not these things, but myself, to know whether I am a monster more complicated and more furious than Typhon or a gentler and simpler creature, to whom a divine and quiet lot is given by nature.⁶⁸

Socrates thus associates the question of self, and knowledge of self, to imaginary beings, and also metaphorically models the self he might find through his investigation to “Typhon,” or some less frightening creature of myths. The philosophical pursuit of Socrates is thus primarily directed towards a proper understanding of one’s self, and the proper comprehension of love (a daimonic force, according to Plato) is essential to this project. Socrates states that love is a kind of madness, but that there are two kinds of madness, “one arising from human diseases, and the other from a divine release from the customary habits.”⁶⁹ Further, he makes “four divisions of the divine madness, ascribing them to four gods, saying that prophecy was inspired by Apollo, the mystic madness by Dionysus, the poetic by the Muses, and the madness of love, inspired by Aphrodite and Eros, we said was the best.”⁷⁰ The main problem with the speech written by Lycias and Socrates’ response in the beginning of the dialogue was not that the other was written and the other “purely oral,” but that they did not proceed in a philosophical manner. Those speeches approached the insanity of love from two different starting points, and consequently recovered two different conceptions of it,

sis different from Derrida’s. Such choices are ultimately derived from different perceptions about the task of the reader. Socrates can be interpreted as addressing exactly these questions of differing interpretations in Plato’s dialogue.

⁶⁶ *Phaedrus* 242d.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 229d-e.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 229e-230a.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 265a.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

“the left-handed” and “right-hand part of madness.”⁷¹ “Now I myself,” Socrates claims, “am a lover of these processes of division and bringing together, as aids to speech and thought; and if I think any other man is able to see things that can naturally be collected into one and divided into many, him I follow after and walk in his footsteps as if he were a god.”⁷² The figurative expressions used in speeches to describe love contained some truth of the matter, but the most important element is the analytical method that we can reach only if we maintain some sort of *organised relationship* between the different perceptions or interpretations of the subject. True rhetoric is, according to Socrates, based on philosophy and could carry its name; it is art in the same sense as the art of healing. As *ethical* use of language, it must take into consideration the “conditions,” “knowledge and practice” that is gained in the dialectical relationship to other people. It is healing, as it aims to make whole. Nevertheless, it does not amount to “exclusion of madness,” in the sense that love is a divine form of madness, and the philosopher is a “lover of wisdom.” An alternative reading of the demonic in *Phaedrus* would proceed in these lines to point out that Plato/Socrates is actually trying to recognise the madness in thought and being. This integrative interpretation would also pay special attention to the status of myths in Plato’s text, but it would argue that these myths are employed not (at least not only) to bolster the authority of father-figure, but (also, and perhaps more importantly) to protect a healing position toward language, reason and signification. Derrida pays attention to how the Platonic discourse presents philosophy as a way to cure us from the fear of death; in each of us there is a “little boy” who fears death as he fears a *mormolukeion* (a bogeyman).⁷³ Philosophical self-knowledge should act as an “exorcism” of this bogey, but philosophy can find itself as a cure only if it is a dialogue with the other, and studies the role of otherness in its constitution. It must recognise its potentials and even responsibilities to heal, to try to make whole. This is also an important part in the task of the reader.

How much Platonic philosophy actually was such a dialogue, remains debatable.⁷⁴ An integrative reading of the demonic elements in *Phaedrus*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 266a.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 266b.

⁷³ *Phaedo* 77e; Derrida 1972/1981, 120. Derrida points out that there exists a chiasmatic (inverse) relationship between two ambiguous cure/poisons: the writing and the hemlock Socrates drinks as he is sentenced to death. Therefore, Derrida argues, Platonic philosophy as an ambivalent cure of soul by killing the body takes part in the structure and logic of *pharmakon*, permeated by the effects of writing. (*Ibid.*, 127.)

⁷⁴ *Phaedo* certainly attempts to present love of wisdom (*philo-sophia*) as leading naturally into death, as cure from the imperfections of body (in his dying words Socrates asks Crito to sacrifice a cock to Asclepius, god of healing; *Phaedo* 118). The Platonic cure can thus be interpreted as a denial of its other, the corporeal imperfections of existence. The *daimonion* of Socrates as something that only inhibited him from making any mistakes, or from attaching himself to the beliefs of other people, acts as a perfect figurative embodiment of this attitude. (Thomas Gould [1990, 242] supposes that Socrates’ case was one of “benign paranoia.” There has been much speculation on the subject: see L.F. Le-

would nevertheless locate the daimonic as an important aspect of the “dynamic identity” that we can give both to this text, and the self it attempts to construct.

(INTER)TEXTUAL SELF AND THE DEMONIC TEXT

Intertextuality is that concept which has gathered under its heading many of those aspects of textuality that have been thematised above as “demonic.” There could hardly be any notion of “textuality” in the sense it is applied here, were there not a wide interest in different forms of intertextuality. There is always danger in the actual analysis of reducing intertextuality into a contemporary version of “source-influence studies,” even if theoretical formulations profess more radical intentions. It is my aim in the rest of this chapter to focus on the role of otherness in intertextuality, and on how this relates to my interest in the demonic. Specifically, my reading will find the formulations by Roland Barthes on textuality useful: they illustrate well several aspects of the preceding discussions on the self, the demonic and the text.

The concept of ‘intertextuality’ was coined by Julia Kristeva in 1967, even if the ideas included in it are derived from many earlier theories. The single most important source for the development of intertextuality as a critical concept was Mikhail Bakhtin, and his thoughts concerning the many aspects of “dialogue” in literature. Soon after her arrival in Paris from Bulgaria, Julia Kristeva began her role as an important intermediary figure by introducing the Russian Formalists and especially Mikhail Bakhtin to Western intellectuals.⁷⁵ As the case of ‘intertextuality’ points out, she was never just a passive conduit of ideas: she actively recontextualised and reinterpreted the elements she introduced.

As Michael Holquist has emphasised, Bakhtin’s philosophy is a pragmatically oriented theory of knowledge. It is “one of several modern epistemologies that seek to grasp human behavior through the use humans make of language.” Holquist maintains that Bakhtin has a distinctive place among these systems of thought owing to the “dialogic concept of language” Bakhtin proposed as fundamental.⁷⁶ According to this view, language is not a phenomenon separate from existence: there are units of existence we call “selves” and units of language (“words”), and both of them share common logic – “nothing *is* in itself.”⁷⁷ Consciousness is always a relation between a centre (I-for-itself) and everything that is not centre (the-not-I-in-me); *self*

lut, *Du démon de Socrate: spécimen d'une application de la science psychologique a celle de l'histoire* [Paris, 1836].)

⁷⁵ Kristeva’s association with *Tel Quel* magazine brought her ideas to the attention of Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and others early on. (See, e.g. Toril Moi’s introduction to *The Kristeva Reader*; Kristeva 1986.)

⁷⁶ Holquist 1990/1994, 15.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 31, 41.

exists only as a relation, it is based on *otherness*.⁷⁸ Being is an event that is “unique and unified” (suffering and death operate as constant reminders how existence is thus located), but also *shared*. The event of existence occurs at sites that are unique, but never complete in themselves.⁷⁹

The basic case of dialogue is two people discussing with each other. Bakhtin, however, perceives the communication situation as much more complicated than a simple transfer of meaning via signs from sender to receiver. In lines suggestive of L.S. Vygotsky and Jacques Lacan, Bakhtin emphasises how our words are never just “ours”; language is always realised as the use of language (discourse), and this process is fundamentally permeated by effects of interplay between interlocutors and the history of discourse. This interchange in discourse produces constantly new and potentially subversive meanings. Bakhtin quotes Leo Spitzer on dialogue: “When we reproduce in our speech a small chunk of our interlocutor’s utterance, already by virtue of the change of speakers a change in tone inevitably occurs: *on our lips the ‘other’s’ words always sound foreign to us, and very often have an intonation of ridicule, exaggeration, or mockery [...]*.”⁸⁰ Bakhtin coins several concepts to describe the different dialogical effects: ‘polyphony,’ ‘carnavalesque’ and ‘heteroglossia.’ The decontextualising power of language is approached from a decisively different angle by Bakhtin as compared to Derrida. Bakhtin fully acknowledges how each word is open to radically different meanings by dislocations of context, but he stresses the existence of both “centripetal” as well as “centrifugal” forces in signification. “There can be no dialogical relationships among texts,” Bakhtin writes, if one takes “a strictly linguistic approach” to these texts. Bakhtinian dialogism is related to the complex interweaving of the linguistic and the extra-linguistic: he is interested in the “linguistics of utterance,” as compared to the structuralist linguistics of sign.⁸¹ It would not be correct, according to this view, to deny the text the powers of its reader and the context of reading. The individual is a site for dialogue between “self” and “other,” and meaning is life in tension at the simultaneity of centre and non-centre. Instead of constantly (and basically arbitrarily) debunking the centre, the heterogeneity and differentiation is in Bakhtin’s theory posited in a dialogue with the centre; the fundamental unintelligibility of difference is replaced by dynamic and particular comprehensions by subjects that are rooted in social experience. As Holquist writes, Bakhtin has translated Dostoyevsky’s vision of the heart of man as a battleground between good and evil “into a proposition that the mind of man is a theater in which the war between the centripetal impulses of cognition and the centrifugal forces of the world is fought out.”⁸² The

⁷⁸ Ibid., 18, 29.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 24-25.

⁸⁰ Bakhtin 1929/1973, 161 (quoting Spitzer, *Italienische Umgangssprache*, 1922, pp. 175-76). Emphasis in the original.

⁸¹ Ibid., 151. See also Holquist 1990/1994, 40-50.

⁸² Holquist 1990/1994, 47.

demonic can gain fresh intelligibility from this simultaneous existence of resemblance and difference.

Especially important to the subject of this study are Bakhtin's readings of the grotesque and polyphony. Bakhtin perceives the grotesque as an alternative mode of realism, one that has been consistently rejected and excluded from the "high" discourses of our culture. The modern ("Bourgeois") subject relates to his body as the "private," often hidden and individualised area with clear, clean boundaries separating him from others. Grotesque imagery evokes an alternative perception of self as a site of metamorphosis, death and birth, sex and defecation, of growth and becoming. The traditional demonic imagery is at the centre of this domain: the grotesque images are "ambivalent and contradictory; they are ugly, monstrous, hideous from the point of view of 'classic' aesthetics, that is, the aesthetics of the ready-made and the completed."⁸³ Bakhtin guides us to look at the demonic tradition from a point of view different from the Romantic, individualistic position; he points out that in the "diableries of the medieval mysteries, in the parodical legends and the *fabliaux* the devil is the gay ambivalent figure expressing the unofficial point of view, the material bodily stratum."⁸⁴ The carnival was traditionally the event for celebrating this register of expression (and mode of existence, as well, as the production of meaning through expression is inseparable from existence as such⁸⁵). Bakhtin argues in his *Rabelais and His World* (1965) for a positive interpretation of this subversive (sometimes even violent) occasion; according to him, the carnival allows for a "temporary suspension of all hierarchic distinctions and barriers among men and of certain norms and prohibitions of usual life."⁸⁶ Bakhtin was specifically interested in the language "which mocks and insults the deity," in profanities and oaths. The ambivalent laughter associated with all these inversions and transgression serves finally a regenerative purpose. It degrades and debases all that is high and spiritual, abstract and ideal; it brings these ideas into the material level and into contact with the body. In Bakhtin's view, to "degrade an object does not imply merely hurling it into the void of nonexistence, into absolute destruction, but to hurl it down into the reproductive lower stratum, the zone in which conception and new birth take place."⁸⁷

Bakhtin's study of Dostoyevsky (*Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, originally published in 1929) explores the polyphony of literary text from similar starting points. He explores the tension of Dostoyevsky's text as a peculiar mixture of the serious and comical; the text displays a polyphony that cannot be reduced into a single position. The historical development of such dialogic elements in the novel can be seen to derive from the carniva-

⁸³ Bakhtin 1965/1984, 25.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 40-41. See also pp. 266-67.

⁸⁵ Holquist 1990/1994, 49.

⁸⁶ Bakhtin 1965/1984, 15.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 19, 21.

lesque mode, and particularly from the “serio-comical” genres such as Socratic dialogue and Menippean satire.⁸⁸ Dostoyevsky was the creator of “true polyphony,” but these old traditions are important in paving the way for polyphony.⁸⁹ The essence of polyphony, as Bakhtin sees it, lies in the simultaneous use of incongruous discourses, positions or value horizons without reducing one to the other; “the combination of full-valued consciousnesses with their worlds.” The self or subject is taken into consideration, but not in an individualistic sense, but in its constant dialogue with the other. Bakhtin valued Dostoyevsky so highly, because he thought that Dostoyevsky’s novels succeed in expressing simultaneously many voices, or consciousnesses without some Hegelian movement of dialectic (merging them under a unifying point of view, or developing spirit). He likens this to the way in which the “souls and spirits” do not merge in Dante’s formally polyphonic world.⁹⁰ The plurality of demons and angels, the spirits of sinners and saints works as an analogy to the heterogeneity of these modern novels, not because Dostoyevsky had somehow failed to achieve a unity, but because such pluralism is a powerful way of pointing out how “the consciousness is never self-sufficient; it always finds itself in an intense relationship with other consciousnesses.”⁹¹ The polyphony and non-unified heterogeneity highlight the fundamental role of dialogue for both language and the self; different conflicting compounds of high and low discourses, and parodies of sacred texts and rituals have therefore an important role for a Bakhtinian analysis.⁹²

Kristeva reformulated Bakhtin’s dialogism in textual terms in her article “Bakhtine, le mot, le dialogue et le roman” (1967).

Bakhtin foreshadows what Emile Benveniste has in mind when he speaks about *discourse*, that is ‘language appropriated by the individual as a practice.’ As Bakhtin himself writes, ‘In order for dialogical relationships to arise among [logical or concrete semantic relationships], they must clothe themselves in the word, become utterances, and become the positions of various subjects, expressed in a word.’⁹³ Bakhtin, however, born of a revolutionary Russia that was preoccupied with social problems, does not see dialogue only as language assumed by subject; he sees it, rather, as a *writing* where one reads the *other* (with no allusion to Freud). Bakhtinian dialogism identifies writing as both subjectivity and communication, or better, as intertextuality. Confronted with this dialogism, the notion of a ‘person-subject of writing’ becomes blurred, yielding to that of ‘ambivalence of writing’.⁹⁴

⁸⁸ Bakhtin 1929/1973, 89.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 104.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 151.

⁹⁴ Kristeva 1986, 39.

This formulation goes against the direct confirmation by Bakhtin, that “there can be no dialogical relationships among texts.” Kristeva underlines that she replaces the concept of “intersubjectivity” with that of intertextuality, and that her main aim is to capture Bakhtin’s notions of ‘dialogue’ and ‘ambivalence’ at the intersection of the two axes of discourse – the word as existing both between writer and addressee, and as oriented toward an anterior or synchronic literary corpus.⁹⁵ It proved difficult, however, to reconcile the decisively “anti-Saussurean” concept of dialogism with “post-Saussurean” Western theory. Already in *La Révolution du langage poétique* (1974) Kristeva complained that intertextuality “has been understood in the banal sense of ‘study of sources,’” and reformulated it in a sense simultaneously more general and more specific: “*intertextuality* denotes this transposition of one (or several) sign-system(s) into another [...]” – the demonstrative “this” pointing specifically at the case of the novel as the result of a redistribution of the sign systems of carnival, courtly poetry and scholastic discourse.⁹⁶

There is finally no way of stopping intertextuality of being either reduced into a purely formal study of textual relations, or of being radicalised into the cheerful insanity of unlimited differance, if the reality of suffering and death on the other hand, and the joys and tensions in our corporeal existence are excluded from its theory. Kristeva attempts to ward off these tendencies by the introduction of *chora* (enclosed space, womb) as a counterpart of the *thetic* splitting of the semiotic continuum. Derrida’s project is in Kristeva’s eyes guilty of not differentiating properly these aspects that must be taken into consideration to become the subject-in-process in the symbolic order. She claims that “in its desire to bar the *thetic* and put (logically or chronologically) previous energy transfers in its place, the grammatological deluge of meaning gives up on the subject and must remain ignorant not only of his functioning as social practice, but also of his chances of experiencing *jouissance* or being put to death.”⁹⁷ In her practice as a psychoanalyst, Kristeva has also developed ethics and epistemology as central to the analytic process. As Toril Moi summarises:

The analyst, who is under the ethical obligation to try to cure her patients, is not free to say whatever she likes, to engage in a free play of the signifier. Instead there *is* a truth in analysis: a correct intervention or a mistaken one. That this ‘truth’ may change from day to day and is utterly de-

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 36-7.

⁹⁶ *La Révolution du langage poétique* (Paris, 1974; pp. 59-60); Kristeva 1986, 111. – Michael Holquist quotes Tony Bennett’s clarifying extension of Kristeva’s original definition: whereas ‘intertextuality’ comprehends references to “other texts which can be discerned within the internal composition of a specific individual text,” Bennett uses ‘*inter-textuality*’ to refer to “the social organization of the relations between texts within specific conditions of reading” (Bennett and Janet Woollacott, *Bond and Beyond* [London, 1989]; quoted in Holquist 1990/1994, 88).

⁹⁷ Kristeva 1974/1984, 142.

pendent on its specific context does not prevent it from existing. The proof of this particular form of truth lies in the cure: if there is not truth in analysis, there will be no cure either. Kristeva's notion of truth, then, emphasizes its effects on the *real*: it is a dimension of reality, not only of the signifier.⁹⁸

Intertextuality is not "freedom to say everything" – that sort of concept would indeed make all textuality inherently demonic, and unable to find any critical power from its endless transgressions and self-reference. Kristeva emphasised early on that dialogism is dramatic blasphemy or banter [*raillerie*; Lautreamont], and has rules of its own (it "accepts *another law*").⁹⁹ The particular way Roland Barthes has defined textuality attempts to build on such an oppositional understanding of intertext to produce a particular, demonic interpretation of text.

The Text is plural. Which is not simply to say that it has several meanings, but that it accomplishes the very plural of meaning: an *irreducible* (and not merely an acceptable) plural. [...] The reader of the Text may be compared to someone at a loose end [the text is a tissue, a woven fabric] [...]; what he perceives is multiple, irreducible, coming from a disconnected, heterogeneous variety of substances and perspectives: lights, colours [...]. All these *incidents* are half-identifiable: they come from codes which are known but their combination is unique, founds the stroll in a difference repeatable only as difference. [...] The work has nothing disturbing for any monistic philosophy (we know that there are opposing examples of these); for such a philosophy, plural is Evil. Against the work, therefore, the text could well take as its motto the words of the man possessed by demons (*Mark* 5:9): 'My name is Legion: for we are many.' The plural of demoniacal texture [should be: "plural *or* demoniacal"; *la texture plurielle ou démoniaque*] which opposes text to work can bring with it fundamental changes in reading, and precisely in areas where monologism appears to be the Law [...].¹⁰⁰

Barthes's characterisations of the text as a new disciplinary object ("The Death of the Author," 1968; "From Work to Text," 1971) have been popular, and it is important to note how openly these formulations display an ambivalent sympathy and concern with the demonic. Barthes has further emphasised the role of demonic polyphony for his own thought by adopting the same metaphor in his inaugural lecture, as he accepted the Chair of Literary Semiology of the Collège de France. In this speech he discusses how power has traditionally been perceived as a single object; the demonic metaphor offers an alternative – "what if power were plural, like demons? 'My name is Legion,' it could say [...]. Some expect of us intellectuals that we

⁹⁸ Moi, "Introduction"; Kristeva 1986, 17-18. Moi is referring specifically to Kristeva's article "Le vréel" (1979; translated as "The True-Real" in Kristeva 1986, 214-37).

⁹⁹ "Word, Dialogue, and Novel"; Kristeva 1986, 41.

¹⁰⁰ Barthes, "From Work to Text" (1971); Barthes 1977, 159-60 (cf. Barthes 1984, 73-74).

take action on every occasion against Power, but our true battle is elsewhere, it is against *powers* in the plural, and this is no easy combat.”¹⁰¹ The Text (in the sense utilised by Barthes in the early 1970s) is an “antidisciplinary object,” that shatters disciplinary boundaries, and operates therefore as a “critique of disciplinary reason.”¹⁰² The demonic ambivalence marks with its plurality both the effects of power, and the attempts to produce an alternative to the hegemony of the author and his work. The connection between the author and the work is “legal,” and it becomes, according to Barthes, an obligation for a textual reader to liberate the signification from its monological, legal state, and to pluralise it.¹⁰³ As the traditional conceptions of Power and work are “monist” (singular, reducible to a unified system), the textual reader is reading specifically those aspects that are rejected by the traditional system. In other words, he is reading Evil.

The “demoniacal texture” and plurality of the text are realised in the act of reading, and Barthes’s conception of the text as demonic implies also a particular view on the reading/writing self. In “The Death of the Author” Barthes advocates the “removal” of the author, and connects this to the wide interpretation of the intertextual:

We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the ‘message’ of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash.¹⁰⁴

After this affirmation of anonymity and loss of any integrating subjectivity in the text, Barthes makes a reference to Jean-Pierre Vernant’s studies of ambiguity and tension in Greek tragedy. Barthes focuses on the nature of tragedy, stating that

its texts [are] woven from words with double meanings that each character understands unilaterally (this perpetual misunderstanding is exactly the ‘tragic’); there is, however, someone who understands each word in its duplicity and who, in addition, hears the very deafness of the characters speaking in front of him – this someone being precisely the reader (or here, the listener). [...] The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its destination.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Barthes, “Inaugural Lecture” (1977); Barthes 1983, 459.

¹⁰² Mowitt 1992, 13, 23 *et passim*. Mowitt operates in his study with the multiple meanings of discipline as ‘branch of learning,’ and ‘set of rules,’ or ‘control of behaviour.’ He sees *pharmakos* (scapegoat) mechanism as a part of the “violence of reason” operating in the academia; the text is blurring the boundaries and thereby resisting the (aggressive) expulsion of the other (*ibid.*, 38).

¹⁰³ “Texte (théorie du)”; Barthes 1973b, 998).

¹⁰⁴ “The Death of the Author” (1968); Barthes 1977, 146.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 148.

Barthes continues by stressing the anonymity of such a unifying reader: “the reader is without history, biography, personality” – yet such aspects of the reader have been very much in Barthes’s interests. The leisurely “stroll” of the reader among the heterogeneity of textual landscape may claim that this subject is “passably empty,” but he is nevertheless a certain kind of subject: one with an eye for the multiple possibilities of combination, for the subversive beauties of reading differently. The reader implied by Barthes’s theory of the text is a subject with a particular aesthetics.

This link between the text and the self is manifest in Barthes’s language and in his metaphors. Barthes responds to a deeply personal dimension of language, as well as to language as an abstract system, as a set of rules and lexical items, or as an alienating and ideological machinery. This has repeatedly captured the attention of commentators; Patricia Lombardo states that the “site” of Barthes always has been language, and that he was already known as the “fanatic of language” in 1947.¹⁰⁶ Michael Moriarty sees the personal meaning of language as a threat to his theoretical purity; the extralinguistic area is all the time creeping back into Barthes’s studies in textuality.¹⁰⁷ Jonathan Culler refers to how Barthes himself has likened his life to his writing (“I am the story which happens to me”¹⁰⁸) and summaries: “For himself, as for us, Barthes is a collection of writings [...] ‘Barthes’ is itself a construction formed to order these [contrasting and contradicting] fragments.”¹⁰⁹ The mutual intertwining of the text and the self into a peculiar sort of compound (a “textual self”) is underlined figuratively by the use of “network”; in an essay titled “The Plates of the *Encyclopedia*” (1964) Barthes analyses “the astonishing image of man reduced to his network of veins.”¹¹⁰ In discussion of the text, Barthes affirms that the “metaphor of the Text is that of the *network* [*réseau*]”;¹¹¹ and, finally, the image from the *Encyclopedia* is reproduced at the closing pages of *Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes*, emphasising the role of network as a metaphor of a textual self. This metaphor offers an alternative vision, or model: the solidity of an object is being replaced by a structure of relations. It is an illustration of internal complexity that has been extracted beyond the apparent unity; yet, this nebulous network still maintains an inner logic and organisation. The illustration even retains the form of human body, even if this body has been disrobed of its reassuring familiarity and wholeness. In *Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes* the author¹¹² claims he has several bodies – *le corps pluriel* – “I have digestive body, I have a nauseated body [...]. Further, I am captivated

¹⁰⁶ Lombardo 1989, 16.

¹⁰⁷ Moriarty 1991, 148 *et passim*.


¹⁰⁸ Barthes 1975/1977, 56.

¹⁰⁹ Culler 1983, 114-15.

¹¹⁰ Barthes 1983, 230.

¹¹¹ Barthes 1977, 161.

¹¹² Barthes plays with the necessarily fictive quality of “autobiography” by delivering his fragments and narratives often in the third person: “All this must be considered as if spoken by a character in a novel – or rather by several characters” (1975/1977, 119).



“The Vascular System” (from the *Encyclopédie*; Barthes 1974, endplate).

to the point of fascination by the socialized body, the mythological body, the artificial body [...].”¹¹³ The textual movement that renounces the idea of unified subjectivity, can, therefore, simultaneously signify a return to the plurality and otherness of body.

The textual network as a site of contradiction and dynamic identity can already be located in the very first writings of Roland Barthes. In his first published article, “On Gide and His Journal” (1942), Barthes pays attention to how André Gide’s journal consists of “details” without a single great organising principle – the “*Journal* is not an explanatory, an external work; it is not a chronicle (though actuality is often caught in its web [*trame*: weft]).”¹¹⁴ This becomes a model for Barthes’s criticism of Gide, as well:

Reluctant to enclose Gide in a system I knew would never content me, I was vainly trying to find some connection among these notes. Finally I decided it would be better to offer them as such – notes – and not try to disguise their lack of continuity. Incoherence seems to me preferable to a distorting order.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Barthes 1975/1977, 60-61.

¹¹⁴ Barthes 1983, 4.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

The textual play celebrates its freedom in fragments and reticular relationships. The tension between the free play and the violence of structure runs through Barthes's work; he is simultaneously tempted by the promise of ordering and decipherment that sign systems can offer,¹¹⁶ and resists any complete fixation or decipherment of meaning. Barthes's study of textuality is dynamically moving at this interstice between science and myth; the logical endpoint of the former is mathematical language, but this is also "a *finished* language, which derives its very perfection from this acceptance of death." If study of the text is to be able to grasp some "living meaning," it cannot be mathematics, but active production of new connections and meaning – even if this would amount to producing just another myth.¹¹⁷ The epistemological subject implied here is fundamentally entangled in different sign systems, but also in history and historicity as inscribed in body. The subject or "referent" are not naively denied; rather, they are dislocated in a network of multiple fields of reference. In the case of Gide, Barthes celebrates the plurality of this author that appears in Gide's contradictions, in his refusal to choose among alternatives. According to Barthes this textual self is "a simultaneous being," marked by "fidelity and contradictions."¹¹⁸ A paradoxical model of literary selfhood appears in this essay: "self" as a product of its "own" fiction, rather than its source. Barthes quotes and produces a dialogue of Gide and Michelet:

"I wanted to indicate in this '*tentative amoureuse*' the book's influence on the person who is writing it, and during the writing itself. For as it leaves us, it changes us, it modifies the movement of our life ... Our actions have a retroaction upon us" (*Journal*, 1893). Compare these words with Michelet's: "History, in the march of time, makes the historian much more than it is made by him. My book has created me. I am its work" (Preface of 1869).¹¹⁹

Barthes was deeply fond of Jules Michelet, a nineteenth century French historian, and *La Sorcière* (1862; Satanism and Witchcraft) was probably his favourite among Michelet's studies. Often inaccurate as a work of history, this book is characterised by Barthes (in his preface to it) in terms of its novelistic qualities. The particular manner of achieving this literary status is

¹¹⁶ The Eiffel tower, in an essay by Barthes, is one metaphor for this promise: the tower itself is "empty," useless, but it participates in a mythic function – it "fixes, with its slender signal, the whole structure [...] of Paris space" (*ibid.*, 246).

¹¹⁷ Barthes 1957/1989, 193, 195. – The ambivalence towards mathematics is endemic among the humanities; not to repeat any stigmatising gesture, one should point out that the aesthetic dimension inherent in mathematics has been well documented by those with sufficient expertise in this area. (In the words of G.H. Hardy: "Beauty is the first test; there is no permanent place in the world for ugly mathematics." [*A Mathematician's Apology*, 1941; quoted in *The Oxford Companion to the Mind*, page 9]; cf. also Einstein 1939, 139-41.)

¹¹⁸ Barthes 1983, 6-7.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 12.

worth noting: “Novelistic existence is established the moment the witch is provided with a body, scrupulously situated, abundantly described.”¹²⁰ As the body is inserted into history in all its particularity, the narrative function takes over from a (detached) analysis. Michelet is able to speak of the satanic and the magical as real, as he replaces (rational) causality with a logical and poetic link – establishing, according to Barthes, “a new rationality.”¹²¹ Michelet the historian mixes with his work, makes himself “a sorcerer, a gatherer of bones, a reviver of the dead; he took it upon himself to say *no* to the Church and *no* to science, to replace dogma or brute fact by myth.” This discredited historian becomes to Barthes “at once a sociologist, an ethnologist, a psychoanalyst, a social historian; [...] we can say that he truly anticipated the foundation of a general science of man.”¹²²

This fascination with transgressive writing is transcribed in the concept of Text, as Barthes explores structuralism and semiotics in the 1960s and 1970s. The emphasis on the demonic quality of textuality thus signifies several important concerns: the idea of subject and object of knowledge as inseparable; the logic of both/and (the contradiction), instead of either/or; emphasis of body as the site of inscription; and the ethical concern to “liberate” the repressed areas of signification from any monological order. This plurality carries with it an undeniable ambivalence, as might be expected from the area that is the location for limits of subjectivity, and for pleasure in all its irrepressible movement. “The pleasure of the text,” Barthes writes in his book of the same name, “is that moment when my body pursues its own ideas – for my body does not have the same ideas I do.”¹²³ The operations of textuality never totally coincide with the consciousness. In his numerous own contradictions Barthes also displays how interwoven with this ambivalence he himself was.¹²⁴ When commenting on the connotations of his writing, Barthes even likens his Text/himself to “a little devil,” who is engaged in transgressive acts, and simultaneously remains subjected to the Power (as political power, and, ultimately as language):

¹²⁰ “*La Sorcière*” (1959); Barthes 1964/1979, 108.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 111.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 114-15.

¹²³ Barthes 1973/1975, 17. Barthes opposes the “epistemic dignity” of some abstract Desire to the actual enjoyment (pleasures) that are constantly actualised in reading.

¹²⁴ Barthes can claim (in one context) that “text is never a ‘dialogue’ [...]”; the text establishes a sort of islet within the human – the common – relation, manifests the asocial nature of pleasure (Barthes 1973/1975, 16); in another context it might be equally true that “Text is that *social* space which leaves no language safe, outside [...]” (“From Work to Text”; Barthes 1977, 164). The relationship of the demonic text to the social space is charged with tensions and contradictions. Barthes writes both that “literature [...] is absolutely, categorically *realist*,” and that “literature is fundamentally, constitutively unrealistic; literature is unreality itself” (“Inaugural Lecture” [1977]; Barthes 1983, 463; and “Literature Today” [1961]; Barthes 1964/1979, 160). These are but a couple of examples of the ways Barthes has been able to “contradict himself” in his pluralistic and heterogeneous writings.

He [Barthes himself] had written “The text is (should be) that uninhibited person who shows his behind to the Political Father” (*Pleasure of the Text*). One critic pretends to believe that “behind” has been substituted for “ass” out of timidity. What happens to connotation here? A good little devil doesn’t show his ass to Mme MacMiche, he shows her his behind; the childish word was necessary, since we were concerned with the Father. To read in any real way, then, is to enter into connotation.¹²⁵

Demonic imagery and language is peculiarly suitable for such purposes; the demonic is suggestive of elements or impulses that are inappropriate for a subject or work if conceived as a monological unity, but are, nevertheless, parts of a “textual self” in a plural and more comprehensive sense. Devils and demons also convey the sense of conflict, and opposition to power, that is important for heterogeneous and transgressive forms of textuality (these features of demons are explored further in the following chapters). Barthes has identified such conception of text as marked by Evil, and suggested that the self implied by textual reading is analogous to “the man possessed by demons.” Such characterisations carry negative connotations that are important starting points for analysis; the textual or subjective phenomenon that is described with demonic terms is always somehow an unhappy one (*dys-daimonic*, rather than *eudaimonic*). It implies a subject’s entanglement into the structure that defines and determines it, and a simultaneous struggle with this structure. In a text, it takes the form of blasphemous intertextuality, conflicts and contradictions in the production of any textual identity, or self. The determined form of subjectivity can fight the powers of self-definition, but this also means that it deforms and decomposes itself in the process; the fundamental redefinition amounts to a perception of self in terms of deformity, monstrosity, the demonic – as the logic of this self-perception is nevertheless ruled by the structure it attempts to deny. This painful paradox can be posited at the heart of this study.



Developing strategies for reading the demonic in the text, these last two chapters have explored a number of theories, multiple readings of multiplicity. Theories and fictions, these texts have both interpreted the manner in which subjectivity should be understood, and taken part in constructing (and deconstructing) different narratives of it. Rather than finding any “ready-made” answers from the theory, my line of argument has emphasised the task of the reader: no matter what is the agenda of a particular theory, it is finally up to its reader to contextualise it, and to make it work for his or her concerns. My particular focus has been on the role that demons and the demonic are given in these theories.

¹²⁵ Barthes 1975/1977, 79.

Both the theories of the self and theories of the text have bifurcated into two main alternatives: theories either tend to reconcile and resolve possible conflicts and contradictions into some “positive identity,” or favour such conflicts, treasuring their expressive and subversive potentials.

To my mind, the demonic can be most fruitfully read in the tension and undecidability of these alternatives. The blasphemy, heterogeneity and conflicts of this area challenge interpretative activity and bestow a sense of urgency on attempts to reach a “healing interpretation.” Yet, such an interpretation can never be total, or complete, if it is to be faithful to its demonic subject matter; if a demonic text can harbour a “textual self,” such an identity can only be polyphonic, contradictory – possessed by “many voices.”

The second part of my study explores the demonic in various popular texts that can be identified as “fictions” in a more traditional sense. The next chapter operates as a short introduction to the demons in horror literature, chapters five to eight discuss examples taken from this genre, whereas the remaining two analyses are dedicated to the developments outside horror as a genre.